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 In 2005, the fi rst day of my new job as permanent secretary (equiva-
lent to a company chief executive offi  cer [CEO]) of Kenya’s Ministry of 
Information and Communications was dramatic. In response to a jour-
nalist’s question about what I would do about the corruption in the ICT 
sector, I said, I needed time to study the situation and would do my best 
to tackle it. 
 It was the fi rst media interview in my life. I was still trying to under-
stand my new assignment and what it meant to the people of Kenya. Th e 
previous night, President Mwai Kibaki had appointed me to work with 
the Hon. Mutahi Kagwe, who was appointed as minister (equivalent to 
a nonexecutive chairman of the board). Th e minister is the political head 
of the ministry. 
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 As the top civil servant in the ministry, I was responsible for policy-
making and implementation. Everything in the ICT and media sectors 
ended up on my desk. Corruption issues topped the agenda fi nancially at 
the ministry. Th e incumbent telecom, Telkom Kenya, was bleeding fi nan-
cially and losing revenues. Powerful cartels from the private sector in col-
lusion with staff  were stealing the company’s assets through phony court 
cases while employees were colluding with international cartels to use the 
local network without paying (a practice known as the grey market in 
telecommunications). Publicly owned shares of the new mobile company, 
Safaricom, had disappeared to a secretive company registered in Guernsey 
under nominee accounts. Radio frequencies, a public resource, had largely 
been inappropriately allocated to well-connected individuals and compa-
nies, meaning that new entrants could not enter the broadcasting market. 
 At every function, I faced a barrage of questions from media, donor 
agencies, and civil society 1  as well as the public about corruption in the 
sector. I had no answer to any of these questions, but I kept promising 
that we would soon deal with all the issues. At that time, the Ministry of 
Information as well as my post in it had a fairly low profi le. I quickly real-
ized that the industry had no policy in place. Previous attempts to have a 
policy in place were always frustrated by strong vested interests. 
 Th e elephant in the room was what we would do to open up the indus-
try by subverting corrupt networks. Before I joined the sector in 2005, 
privatization was a pressing matter. Th e new minister and I consulted 
with the industry and concluded that the answers lay in policy changes. 
We revised a draft policy document (Government of Kenya  2006 ) that 
had been developed earlier and formally adopted it through publica-
tion in the  Kenya Gazette , the government legal publication. Th ereafter, 
implementation—though characterized by risk—started in earnest. 
 On paper, Kenya’s ICT sector was liberalized. However, the reality 
was that the incumbent telecom, a creation from the colonial days, con-
trolled key resources such as the international gateway. Th is monopoly 
status made calling costs very expensive, sometimes 70 % more than in 
countries like India. New fi rms had no option but to endure exorbitant 
1  In this case, civil society refers to many diff erent nongovernment organizations and public institu-
tions that represent the interests of Kenya’s citizen. 
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prices, which they passed on to the consumer. Th e incumbent as the gate-
keeper for all international connections controlled the emerging Internet 
resources. Th e cartels benefi tting in this grey market jealously protected 
the incumbent’s monopoly status and obstructed all eff orts at liberalizing 
the sector. Th is eff ectively stifl ed entrepreneurship and innovation. 
 Quick Wins from the New Sector Policy: 
Market Liberalization 
 We leveraged the policy document to build suffi  cient support from the 
industry in order to open up the sector. We selected fi ve priority areas 
from the document, including development of and access to aff ordable 
infrastructure, content and innovation, capacity building, public–private 
partnership, and the creation of employment opportunities. In spite of 
this open approach to policymaking, we faced challenges. Th e grey mar-
ket cartels waged war against our initiatives. We received death threats 
over the opening up of the international telecommunications gateway 
(ITG) gateways used to link telecommunications operators to the outside 
world. However, we were determined, and we went ahead and opened 
up the industry, enabling competitive environment. Because of the death 
threats, we had to deploy heavy security as we issued new IG licenses. 
Some members of the media who had been manipulated into accusing 
us of destroying the national strategic resource, the incumbent Telkom 
Kenya, eventually began to realize that our actions would be benefi cial 
to all citizens. Th is was the beginning of the transformation of the sector. 
However, because of the technological and other changes, we needed a 
dynamic public policymaking process to accelerate the sector’s entrepre-
neurial reforms. 
 Th is chapter is devoted to an examination of the complex policymak-
ing process and entrepreneurial mindset that led to Kenya’s breakthrough 
in ICTs innovation during President Mwai Kibaki’s administration. It is 
mostly narrative in nature, based on recollections of my participation and 
observations, but it also attempts to use Dror’s general systems theory 
framework ( 1969 ) and Edelenbos and Klijn’s interactive decision-making 
theory ( 2005 ) to help explain the process. 
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 It also provides a detailed account of policy development and the 
institutions that supported Kenya’s ICT innovation dynamics, in the 
process identifying some of the pressing policymaking problems that 
had to be overcome to facilitate innovative thinking on Kenya’s position 
in the so- called information age. Th e rest of the chapter is a narration of 
how innovation policies were made on an ad hoc basis to facilitate devel-
opment. Th ree case studies are analyzed using these theories, revealing 
the two major policy decisions that enabled projects that sparked ICT 
innovation in Kenya. 
 The Public Policymaking Process 
 Policymaking is a dynamic and complex process and one that is nec-
essary in creating a level playing fi eld in any sector. To refl ect chang-
ing circumstances—and because they rarely address all pertinent issues 
exhaustively—policies need regular iterations. 
 Th e process of public policymaking is a decision-centric and a goal- 
driven process (Geurts  2014 ). Decision-centric processes are those that 
require decisions to be made. Goal-driven processes are those that require 
a desired outcome. Goal-driven processes are not static, and iterations are 
performed until the outcome has been produced. Th e fi nal outcome is 
thus often a compromise between the targeted result and the constraints 
encountered. Th e framework suggested in this chapter is largely decision- 
centric and perhaps explains why Dror ( 1969 ) found systems theory 
to be a more eff ective tool to explain the continuous and often ad doc 
nature of policymaking. According to Dror’s approach, for policy to be 
sustained, it requires a continuous input of resources and motivation. It 
is a dynamic process that changes with time and whose subprocesses and 
phases vary internally and with respect to each other. 
 In any country, the policymaking process faces several challenges. In 
developing countries, discourse on policymaking processes is rare and 
almost nonexistent, a situation that creates room to manipulate decisions 
in favour of powerful individuals and engenders corruption. 
 Dror ( 1969 ,  1983 ) recognized that the principal problem with con-
temporary public policymaking is the constantly widening gap between 
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what is known about policymaking and how policy is actually made. 
Despite ever-complex and evolving challenges, contemporary society 
relies on static policymaking machinery. At the same time, corporations, 
private institutions, and government organizations need adaptable guide-
lines to help them make urgent decisions. For Dror, general system the-
ory referred to the relations between public policymaking and behavioral 
science and is used to facilitate eff ective policymaking. 
 In interactive decision-making theory, according to Edelenbos and 
Klijn ( 2005 ), the public actors, faced with the challenge of translating 
political objective into policy, attempt alternative ways of creating pol-
icy. Perceived problems in policy practices are responsible for protracted 
decision-making process and the resistance of various actors. Proposed 
solutions are often not inventive enough for policymakers to make real 
change. Often, there is a large gap between the objectives of politicians 
and those of civil servants and the citizens that the policy is supposed to 
serve. Th is is the case in a country like Kenya, where politicians have no 
ideological leaning but change policy positions not on account of ideol-
ogy but out of political expediency. 
 Nurturing Emerging Tech Entrepreneurs 
 In their book  Start-up Nation , Senor and Singer ( 2009 ) demonstrated 
the power of innovation and entrepreneurship to propel an economy to 
unimaginable growth levels. Th ey detailed how Israel nurtured technology 
start-ups by investing in research and development to become one of the 
major global players in technology, even rivaling Silicon Valley. In 2008, 
Israel, a country of 7.1 million people with no natural resources, attracted 
“close to $2 billion in venture capital, as much as fl owed to the U.K.’s 61 
million citizens or the 145 million people living in Germany and France 
combined” (Senor and Singer  2009 ). Th e success was largely due to the 
“government’s macroeconomic policies that played an important role in 
speeding up the country’s growth, reversing it, and then unleashing it in 
ways that even the government never expected” (Senor and Singer  2009 ). 
 However, start-ups do not just grow; they are nurtured. Technology 
entrepreneurs get advice from a variety of sources, including directors, 
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advisory board members, friends, and informal advisors (Choi and 
Stark  2005 ). Th ese advice networks serve as important sources of infor-
mation about business, technical, and social issues for the entrepre-
neurial community. 
 Applied to policymaking in the Kenyan context, this means that a 
combination of an enabling policy environment, investments in research 
and development, and good advisory networks are necessary for nurtur-
ing a successful technology entrepreneurship start-up program. And in 
fact, sustained government interventions contributed to the success of 
several start-up support systems in Kenya, such as iHub, iLab, M-Lab, 
and 88mph. 
 Two of the policy interventions discussed below were instrumental in 
putting Kenya on the global ICT map. 
 Policymaking in the Kenyan Context 
 Public policymaking in Kenya in the decade under review was made 
more complex by the fact that it was happening in an environment of 
emergent technologies—and of policymakers with limited experience in 
the subject matter and even less of the skills necessary to build bold, 
innovative policies. 
 As in other countries, most public policies are the result of a change 
in political leadership. In Kenya, the ministries or departments develop 
a policy statement in line with the vision and political agenda of the 
incoming administration and pass it on to the cabinet—composed of 
the president and the cabinet secretaries. Once the cabinet has approved 
the policy statement, it is then shared with stakeholders for comments to 
refl ect the demands of the Kenya Constitution (Government of Kenya 
 2010 ), which demands that policymaking be consultative, participatory, 
collaborative, and transparent. 
 This constitutional requirement notwithstanding, achieving 
meaningful consultation is a core challenge of policymaking in 
Kenya. This is because leaders often assume that the public partici-
pates meaningfully and agrees with the proposed agenda when, in 
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reality, the opposite is true. In many cases, there is lack of incentive 
for the public to meaningfully contribute to the policies that affect 
them. Additionally, in most public consultation hearings, Kenyan 
civil society actors highjack hearings and turn them into avenues for 
political debate on other issues. 
 Once the consultative period has ended, public views are incorporated 
into the policy document, which is then sent back to the cabinet for the 
fi nal approval. If no existing legislation exists on which the policy can be 
underpinned, the policy is accompanied by a new draft bill. 
 If a policy goes through these stages successfully, it is then forwarded 
to the Attorney General’s offi  ce to ensure it does not confl ict with 
other policies or laws. If it requires legislation, it is then forwarded to 
Parliament for deliberations as a bill before it become an Act (law) after 
receiving presidential assent. Policies that do not require any legislation 
(i.e., where a legal framework exists but there are no regulations) are 
published in the  Kenya Gazette . After publication, implementation of 
the policy starts. 
 Th e time it takes for any policy document to go through all these 
stages can range anywhere from six months to ten years, mostly depend-
ing on the commitment and infl uence of the sponsoring ministry and 
of the cabinet. When a policy contains contentious issues that politi-
cians do not want to deal with, it might even take longer. For example, 
an attempt to develop a Freedom of Information Law, which seeks to 
ensure that every citizen has a right to information, encountered resis-
tance. Th is bill has taken more than ten years and has yet to be passed by 
Parliament simply because politicians think that citizens will gain access 
to their sensitive data. With this kind of highly politicized policymaking 
process, it is no wonder that development in most developing countries 
becomes paralyzed. 
 Fortunately for us, before the the promulgation of the 2010 con-
stitution, the president had powers to bypass the cabinet and have 
a policy in place within a week. Th e minister and I, working closely 
with the president, exploited this opportunity in executing our 
ICT projects  in record time. However, presidential discretion was a 
 double-edged sword. 
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 Using the presidential powers, we were able to push through other 
policies that, although lying outside our purview, were necessary to the 
success of our sector. Th e fi ve policy objectives we identifi ed—develop-
ment of and access to aff ordable infrastructure, content and innova-
tion, capacity building, public–private partnership, and the creation of 
employment opportunities—each required its own several sub-policies or 
its own policy statement. Public–private partnership, for example, was a 
broader policy that fell within the purview of the Ministry of Finance but 
was an important policy for my department’s goals in ICT development. 
 Problem Statement 
 Innovation precedes policy in emerging areas such as ICTs. Th is, however, 
should not happen if signifi cant resources are committed to research and 
development. Until 2007, Kenya was among 22 Eastern Africa countries 
grappling with the challenge of linking the region to the rest of the world 
through undersea fi ber optic cables. Th e challenge centered on whether 
it was commercially viable to lay such cables and if the governments 
required development assistance to build the infrastructure. At the time, 
no relevant policy existed, and so, naturally, focus turned to the legal 
guidelines that were required to see the project through to completion. 
 A steering committee comprising mostly nontechnical government 
teams from each participating country wanted a policy framework spell-
ing out operations of the proposed project before infrastructure develop-
ment began. Embedded in some of the engagements were government 
interests, all of which had engaged experts to help them in the policy 
negotiations. Th is was in contrast with the team I led, which took the 
view that, because we had the political will, all was needed was the cre-
ation of a general policy statement that could be modifi ed and updated 
as construction went on. In my view, it was premature to formulate a 
comprehensive policy statement in a technical area in which many of the 
participants had limited subject matter expertise. It would be more eff ec-
tive to develop a general policy to help guide those involved gain more 
experience and exposure to the technologies being proposed. 
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 Was Existing Knowledge Suffi cient to Address 
Future Demands for Policy Guidelines? 
 Th e policymaking process under review was happening in the context of 
rapid dynamic technological advances. Th e Kibaki administration aimed 
at minimizing the risk of investing in an area whose contribution to eco-
nomic development was unknown. 
 Th ree subquestions therefore guided our research on the topic: (1) 
How could new ideas be accepted in the absence of a comprehensive 
policy? (2) Could an alternative and more dynamic policy environment 
give us the desired results? (3) Without a comprehensive policy docu-
ment, how could investors be convinced that the management of the 
infrastructure would be fair? 
 What follows is a policymaker’s refl ection on the policy process that 
changed Kenya’s ICT landscape. 
 Th ree cases (projects) that required constant policy revision will be 
discussed using Dror’s general systems theory framework ( 1969 ) and 
Edelenbos and Klijn’s ( 2005 ) interactive decision-making theory to help 
explain the rationale of the policy interventions. 
 Th e cases illustrate the diffi  culty of creating a dynamic policy environ-
ment owing to personal vested interests as well as scant technological 
knowledge by some government offi  cials. 
 General Systems Theory: A Recapitulation 
 Dror is an acknowledged contributor to policy literature. In  Th e Capacity 
to Govern (2001), one of his more remarkable works, he argued that a 
distrust of government has caused a brain drain from elected political 
 positions. Other stakeholders in the political process—industry,  civil 
society , and nongovernmental organizations—however important, he 
argued, cannot compensate for government’s role in defi ning policy, 
which it is democratically empowered to do. Dror argued that radical 
improvements in governance were urgently needed but noted the scarcity 
of salient  policy proposals to achieve this. 
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 Th e Capacity to Govern diagnosed contemporary governments as obso-
lete and proposed changes in values, structures, staffi  ng, public under-
standing, and political culture to equip governance for the radically novel 
challenges of the twenty-fi rst century—and, as such, provided an appropri-
ate lens through which to understand ICT policy development in Kenya. 
Th e framework of Dror’s systems analysis involved three main elements:
 1.  Looking broadly at problems and alternatives, taking into account 
many of the relevant variables and of the probable results—in other 
words, taking a “systems” view; 
 2.  Searching for an optimal, or at least clearly preferable, solution among 
the available alternatives, without being limited to incremental 
changes; and 
 3.  Rationally identifying the preferable alternative (or alternatives) 
through comparison of expected results. 
 However, in my experience, policy rarely followed such a linear path. 
Th e political agenda of leaders is obfuscated by vague and confl icting 
statements and undefi ned national goals, and the policymaker has to 
abstract the real political intentions from such statements, translate them 
into detailed and actionable targets, and attach appropriate policy inter-
ventions to them. 
 Policymakers frequently delegate policymaking to technical staff , a fact 
that can widen the gap between intent and actual policy. Standing alone, 
the general systems approach does not always yield the desired results. 
Th ere is a need to supplement systems theory with one that describes 
the consultative nature of policymaking—that is, interactive decision- 
making theory. 
 Interactive Decision-Making Theory 
 Edelenbos and Klijn ( 2005 ) argued that proposed solutions are often 
not inventive enough for policymakers to create eff ective and actionable 
policy and that there is a large gap between the objectives of politicians 
and those of civil servants and the citizens they were elected to serve. 
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 According to Pröpper and Steenbeek ( 1998 ), it is imperative to close 
the gap between government and its citizens, increase commitment to 
handling challenges, and create support for an interactive and consul-
tative decision-making process. Th is involves understanding that the 
basis of the state–society relationship is that citizens and their leaders 
have the responsibility and commitment to realize goals are in the pub-
lic’s best interest. Klijn and Koppenjan ( 2000 ) suggested that the clo-
sure of the gap between the government and its citizens typically has a 
positive impact on the legitimacy (in terms of support and acceptance) 
of the government. 
 Research camed out by Van der Veen ( 1999 ) in the Netherlands on 
local governments that have experimented with interactive and consul-
tative decision-making found that the infl uence of citizens and interest 
groups on public policymaking was enhanced. Th e main motivations for 
involving stakeholders in interactive decision-making are to diminish the 
veto power of various societal actors by involving them from the start, 
thereby improving the quality of decision-making by using the informa-
tion and solutions of the various actors as well as to bridge the perceived 
growing cleavage between citizens and elected politicians. 
 Th ese two theories are useful in looking at, and explaining, the level of 
feedback loops and interactivity that enabled a dynamic policy develop-
ment process in Kenya, without which much of the success we have seen 
in the ICT sector would never have happened. To illustrate the policymak-
ing dynamism already alluded to in the foregoing discussion, three cases 
are discussed below. Two were successfully implemented, and one failed. 
 The East Africa Marine Systems (Teams) 
 When I joined the Ministry of Information and Communications, there 
was an initiative to provide high-speed connectivity and lower the cost 
of accessing the Internet by linking East Africa to the rest of the world 
through a fi ber optic cable. More signifi cantly, the cable was expected to 
bring closer the dream of having universal broadband connectivity. 
 For six years, the 22-country project had remained at the planning 
stage. Th e amount of money countries had spent in meetings almost 
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 surpassed the actual cost of building the infrastructure. Clearly, some of 
the countries were resistant to the project. 
 Ultimately, after numerous discussions, it became clear that forg-
ing ahead with the project successfully was going to require a unilateral 
approach. Our Ministry decided to abandon the regional initiative in 
favour of a Kenyan-led project—a diffi  cult decision to make in light of 
the politics (local and regional) as well as the vested interests. 
 Th e long process from multilateralism to unilateralism started with 
convincing of our minister, Mutahi Kagwe, of the need to abandon 
the common initiative, which was characterized by political machina-
tions. Next, the minister convinced the then-Minister for Finance, Amos 
Kimunya. Th ree of us met with the president and convinced him that 
the decision we had taken was good for the country. Within three days, 
we developed a temporary policy document and a cabinet memorandum 
(the fi rst step in any policymaking in Kenya). 
 We then sought the direct intervention of President Kibaki, who, hav-
ing concurred with our assessment, agreed to search quickly for a partner-
ship to develop an alternative to the regional initiative. 
 We faced a policy challenge. In 2008, Kenya did not have a policy to 
govern public–private partnerships. Yet, such a policy was necessary to 
convince stakeholders that Kenya would lead the project. To save time, 
we proceeded to get Etisalat Telecommunications Corporation in the 
United Arab Emirates as a junior partner (15 %). Once we had secured 
this initial deal, we came back and mobilized local operators to invest 
in the remaining 85 % of the project. I was sure to modify the original 
cabinet memo to refl ect the partnerships. 
 Once more we approached the president, and his intervention enabled 
us to obtain fi nancial allocation from the government for the initial 
investments in the TEAMS project. To fast-track the project through the 
rigid procurement procedures, I had incorporated a provision in the cabi-
net memo allowing for the creation of a steering committee. 
 Th is committee included Esther Koimett, the investment secretary 
who in Kenya is responsible for overseeing government investments 
and public enterprise, John Waweru (representing the Communication 
Commission of Kenya [CCK], the telecommunications regulator), and 
Robert Hunja (director-general of the Public Procurement Oversight 
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Authority, the entity that oversees public procurement in Kenya). Th e 
committee also included Samuel Kirui (the then-CEO of Telkom Kenya). 
 With this team mobilized, we quickly developed a memorandum of 
understanding with Etisalat of United Arab Emirates and sought price 
quotations to survey the cable route from the two principal global opera-
tors, Tyco and Alcatel. Tyco won the USD3 million and immediately 
started work. Tyco’s timely implementation of the project won the confi -
dence of the local operators that we wanted to partner with. 
 Ordinarily, tenders of such magnitude are published internationally 
for a period of 28 days, and the whole procurement process can take 
up to six months. It took us one month. Director General Hunja, sec-
onded by the World Bank to the Kenya government, quickly understood 
the project’s benefi ts and appreciated our high level of commitment. A 
forward-looking Hunja guided the committee in navigating through the 
2005 Procurement Act, Kenya’s newly launched procurement law. 
 Th ere were still policy challenges around this public–private partner-
ship project. To calm investors, I created a board consisting of all of those 
who had expressed interest in being part of the process—largely local 
telecommunication companies. And with that TEAMS was born. Th e 
TEAMS board created an escrow account to use as a vehicle to mobilize 
the resources required to build the cable. Th is enabled us to proceed with 
the tender to construct the cable. Technically, TEAMS was a government 
outfi t that was subject to procurement rules, but the project was new, 
and some of the procurement processes of building undersea cables had 
not been anticipated in our laws. Th is forced us to rely on the United 
Arab Emirates’ procurement processes as per agreement with Etisalat and 
eventually with Alcatel, which became the contractor. 
 Headwinds 
 Th e process moved at a remarkable speed, but not without challenges. By 
the time the local media were beginning to question the logic of abandon-
ing a regional initiative, we were close to starting the actual construction. 
We encountered hostile media. Around that time, the government had 
introduced a Media Bill requiring self-regulation of the media  industry. 
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Because the media perceived it as an attempt by the state to control 
media, we  concluded that this was main reason for the media hostility. 
 In addition, the Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System, the regional 
cable we had abandoned, and another private initiative put pressure on 
us to abandon the initiative. Th e media accused us of fl outing procure-
ment rules. Th is prompted the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, 
the African Center for Open Governance (Africog), the Effi  ciency 
Monitoring Unit, the auditor general’s offi  ce, and a host of other  civil 
society investigative agencies to start probing the project. 
 Adding to the challenges was the post-election violence in Kenya after 
the disputed presidential elections of 2007. From my 11th-fl oor offi  ce at 
Teleposta Towers, I watched anti-riot police patrol Nairobi’s streets. Th e 
project contractor, Alcatel, wanted legal and fi nancial guarantees in order 
to start the work. And Parliament, which approves such guarantees, was 
not in session. 
 I consulted Joseph Kinyua, my counterpart at the Treasury Department 
and an optimist like me who shared the dream of bringing ICT to Kenya. 
He suggested that I approach the CCK, the then industry regulator, or 
Kenya’s biggest telcom, Safaricom. Both these entities had the fi nancial 
capability to provide a guarantee. 
 Michael Joseph, Safaricom’s CEO at the time, was sympathetic to my 
request but said it would require Safaricom board approval. I concluded 
that selling the idea to the Safaricom board would be a tall order and 
decided to pursue other means. I approached John Waweru, the director- 
general of CCK.  Here too we needed board approval. I pushed the 
agenda through, because I was a board member at CCK. Th at evening, I 
lobbied the board members one by one, and by the time the board met, I 
had suffi  cient support, and they approved the provision of the guarantee. 
Th is did not go down well with Patrick Musimba (now the member of 
Parliament for Kibwezi) who, shortly thereafter, resigned from his board 
position. Permanent Secretary Kinyua then gave confi rmation to CCK’s 
bankers about the deal, Citibank, which needed confi rmation from the 
Treasury before it could give the guarantee. 
 We secured the guarantee a few days before the March 2008 signing of 
the National Peace Accord, which brought peace to Kenya, and within days 
Alcatel moved ships to the United Arab Emirates to begin laying cable. 
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 At the time, many political changes were occurring. My very  supportive 
minister, Mutahi Kagwe, had lost the local election. Unlike today, under 
Kenya’s old constitution this meant that he could not be appointed as a 
cabinet minister. President Kibaki appointed Samuel Poghisio as the new 
minister and retained me in the same position as permanent secretary. 
Th e new minister, Samuel Poghisio, was a former university teacher like 
me, and we developed a good working relationship. 
 Probes 
 Criticism against the project was unrelenting. More than seven diff er-
ent investigative agencies demanded information. Th e majority of the 
investigators had little knowledge of the undersea fi ber optic cable. One 
investigator demanded, “Do you really think the entire country is fool-
ish enough to believe that a 5000 kilometer wire can be laid under the 
sea?” Africog had hired expert investigators whose sound and objective 
analysis was invaluable in helping us explain the project. I convened a 
press conference and stated that I would take full responsibility for any 
impropriety in the project. Th is reassured the public, but it is noteworthy 
that we spent close to USD1 million dollars making copies of everything, 
including thousands of A2-size marine survey documents for transmis-
sion to the phalanx of investigators. 
 Just as we were beginning to see progress, the Privatization Commission 
was created to provide a legal framework for public–private partnerships 
and other privatization projects. TEAMS had been a shell company reg-
istered as a government entity, which came with a number of repercus-
sions. In order to meet the tight deadlines of the commission, we had to 
allocate shares to investors. Th is meant hiring an accounting fi rm to value 
the “assets,” a highly bureaucratic task. Th e investors grew agitated as I 
argued that the law could not be applied retrospectively while maintain-
ing that it was useless to bring in an accounting fi rm when we had been 
making payments through a jointly owned escrow account, of which all 
members of the consortia were signatories. Fortunately, some commis-
sioners began to understand my case. Th e chairman of the Commission 
was a professor of economics and a colleague from the university who 
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explained the intricacies of the matter to his commissioners, and they 
eventually approved the partnership. 
 Th e benefi ts of the cable were felt from the start in 2009. Eric Hersman, 
for example, an American-Kenyan tech enthusiast, asked me to provide 
at least 40 megabits for an open space he was developing to enable young 
people to access broadband for free. I embarked on establishing subsi-
dized connectivity to the space, which was later known as the iHub. I 
gave directives that Telkom Kenya, one of the operators that had been 
acquired by Orange, a French conglomerate, was to provide the needed 
broadband. As I waited to hear the good news that iHub had been con-
nected, Telkom sent me an invoice for USD200,000—money my min-
istry did not have. Clearly, few people had understood the concept of 
subsidized broadband to stimulate innovation. 
 Hersman later secured development assistance and raised capital to 
deliver broadband to iHub, which later became a hotbed of innovation. 
Kenya’s journey as a center for tech start-ups had begun. 
 Th e experience of developing TEAMS was a turning point in the devel-
opment of the current public–private partnership policies and legal frame-
works that are now used in implementing ICT policies in Kenya. Its dynamic 
policy development process enabled the project to be realized in a timely 
manner. Other aspects that led to the success of the project were having the 
courage to take entrepreneurial risks and, even more important, collaborat-
ing with industry through an online policy dialogue platform known as the 
Kenya ICT Action Network KICTANet, which has a global membership 
that shares best practices and seeks to have them implemented locally. 
 M- PESA : A First-of-Its-Kind Money Transfer Tool 
 As we pursued our infrastructure development goals, another innova-
tion with profound implications for monetary transactions emerged: 
M-PESA. Like TEAMS, it called for policy that did not exist and that 
needed to be created. In 2006, Michael Joseph, the CEO of Safaricom, 
a leading telecommunications provider in Kenya (partly government-
owned) sought my ministry’s approval for this new application, to be 
used to transfer money via mobile phone. 
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 Th e application required approval from the Central Bank of Kenya, 
which Joseph found diffi  cult to obtain without my ministry’s support. 
After seeing a demonstration, I concluded that M-PESA was easier to 
use than Posta Pay, a government-owned money transfer app used by the 
Postal Corporation of Kenya and so I promised to support the project. 
 I contacted the Central Bank in order to get support, allowing 
Safaricom to test mobile money transfer in Kenya. Th e then acting gov-
ernor of the Central Bank, Jacinta Mwatela, was extremely cautious and 
understandably so. In the 1990s, Kenya had lost about USD600 million 
through false claims to the government’s export-compensation scheme. 
Th e Central Bank had paid out these monies to a company called 
Goldenberg International Limited, ostensibly as an incentive to boost 
exports of gold. Investigators later found that no gold was exported or 
that it was gold smuggled in from Congo. 
 Because of her negative experience with Goldenberg, Mwatela declined 
to support M-PESA and advised me to do the same. She doubted the 
novel project and eventually asked me to put my request in writing. In 
response to my letter, Mwatela sent four members of her staff  to meet 
with Safaricom executives and me. Th ey were clearly impressed by the 
presentation, although they made no promises. Th e bank directed that 
our ministry, which was responsible for both Posta Pay and Safaricom, 
take the responsibility for the oversight role. I accepted. 
 At the same time, I decided to seek the bank’s formal approval through 
the Treasury. I wrote a letter that I hand-delivered to Permanent Secretary 
Kinyua, who by virtue of his position also sat on the bank board. At the 
time, there existed neither a policy nor a legal framework for the M-PESA 
kind of technology, which informed my decision to hand-deliver the let-
ter. Had I simply mailed the letter, he would have marked it for a senior 
offi  cial to look into existing policy—and naturally, because the policy was 
nonexistent, my request would have been rejected. 
 I explained to the permanent secretary that Kenyans needed a quick 
and effi  cient way of sending money and that the existing Posta Pay trans-
fer could not possibly deliver the effi  ciencies implicit in the M-PESA 
model. As an economist, the permanent secretary wondered whether 
M-PESA could aff ect the money supply and cause disruptions. However, 
the plan was that Safaricom would work with the banks to execute the 
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project so it would not aff ect the money supply. Th e permanent secretary 
agreed to help. 
 In the meantime, I asked my policy team, led by Dr. James Kulubi, to 
draft an electronic transactions bill and a policy document. In addition, I 
briefed Ambassador Francis Muthaura, Secretary to the Cabinet and the 
Head of Public Service, about the new concept and its enormous positive 
implications for the economy. 
 Ambassador Muthaura encouraged us senior servants to take measured 
risk and inject new ideas into the public service. M-PESA was a gamble, 
and if it failed my career was on the line. I lobbied parliamentarians, 
especially the ICT–energy subcommittee that oversaw the operations of 
our ministry. Much of my lobbying consisted of “market education” to 
try to help ensure that the members understood the new product and its 
potential to revolutionize the money transfer industry in Kenya. 
 At the Central Bank, a new governor, Prof. Ndung’u Njuguna, was 
appointed. He was an open-minded academic who soon after his appoint-
ment declared that the M-PESA concept would not pose any danger to 
the Kenyan economy. 
 With that, Safaricom’s Michael Joseph proceeded to implement 
M-PESA in 2007, establishing Kenya as a world leader in mobile money 
transfer technology. 
 Clearly, M-PESA is a classic case in which innovation preceded policy. 
In such cases, policymakers take the risk and, through systemwide con-
sultations, push for supportive policies. 
 Posta Land Development: A Failed Policy 
for the Public Good 
 In 2009, after paying a courtesy call to Kenya’s President Mwai Kibaki, 
the presidents of two giant global corporations said they wanted to invest 
in a social enterprise in Nairobi that would create 10,000 business-
process- outsourcing jobs. In return, Kenya was to provide at least fi ve 
acres of land where the two communications giants would build their 
enterprise. President Kibaki requested that I fi nd the land and report 
back to him. 
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 Although our policy to develop a technology city at Konza was on 
track, this was an urgent opportunity. After a futile search through the 
Ministry of Lands, we identifi ed land owned by the Postal Corporation of 
Kenya at an upmarket area near the well-known Yaya Shopping Center, 
15 minutes from Nairobi City Center. Th e government assessor valued 
the land at Ksh 460 million (USD4.6 million). 
 I directed our legal teams to fi nd out how we could legally transfer it to 
our new investors. Th ey quickly came back with the laws on public land 
disposal, which had very detailed procedures, including approval by the 
board, the minister in charge, and fi nally the fi nance minister, who is the 
custodian of all government property. Th e legal team went through these 
steps very carefully. 
 Despite following the law to the letter, we encountered resistance. Th e 
Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission suspected that the land was 
being acquired unlawfully by a large multinational corporation. Th is trig-
gered a letter from the Commission warning that if I proceeded with the 
process, I would be charged in court. I called the Commission’s Executive 
Director Prof. P.L.O. Lumumba and carefully explained the matter. 
 A few days later, however, Prof. Lumumba gave a public lecture in 
which he censured permanent secretaries for being complicit in cor-
ruption. Specifi cally, he insisted that the procurement of land must be 
consistent with the procurement law. In this case, the eloquent Prof. 
Lumumba was wrong, because the procurement law had no provision 
for land disposal. 
 Prof. Lumumba and the Commission as well as the Postal Corporation 
offi  cials failed to appreciate that, given the rapid decline of postal services, 
we needed innovative technologies such as the business process outsourc-
ing for job creation. 
 Th e challenge was that the public procurement and disposal law did 
not adequately address the sale of land for such developments. Th e dis-
posal that was allowed by law was for minor equipment. Th e law did not 
bar disposal of land but required a much more elaborate process to be 
executed for the sale of public land. 
 Land values in Kenya have greatly appreciated, and land cannot be 
disposed of without valuation. I sent the details of the process we had 
followed to the Commission. Once again, it insisted that we follow the 
11 Inside a Policymaker’s Mind 357
procurement law. By this time, one of the giant corporations had gotten 
wind of the fact that we were subjecting the matter to the procurement 
law and off ered to pay the valuation price. Posta immediately tried to 
scuttle this new development by failing to eff ect board decisions. Th e 
Commission wrote again, insisting that the land should be sold to the 
highest bidder. Th e risk from our perspective was that the highest bidder 
might turn out not to be the companies that caused us to embark on the 
project in the fi rst place. 
 I briefed Ambassador Muthaura, who issued a directive that the land 
be sold at the valuation price. Th e Commission ignored the directive and 
wrote to me saying it would hold me personally responsible. To compli-
cate matters, the management of Posta refused to sign off  on the land. 
We contemplated a disciplinary action against management. However, if 
such a recourse got into the media, it would be costly to the corporate 
image of the two global giants that just wanted to create job opportuni-
ties through ICT development. 
 Later, I discovered that some employees in Posta were enjoying a 
monthly income from leasing the land in question to informal motor 
vehicle dealers. Out of self-interest, they may had looped in some junior 
Commission offi  cials in destroying a deal with a huge potential to  create 
much-needed jobs in Kenya and thwarted an important step toward 
advancing ICT innovation. 
 Th e Posta case is signifi cant in policymaking, because it illustrates 
how policy of any kind cannot work where personal interests obscure 
decision-making. It also shows that, although the upper echelons of gov-
ernment might formulate a policy, middle-level managers can ultimately 
sabotage the policy out of personal interest. Both the general systems and 
interactive decision-making theories work on the assumption that there 
is transparency among all players. Th e reality is that often there is none. 
 Implications for Policy 
 Th e TEAMS and M-PESA cases related here are two projects that sparked 
ICT innovation in Kenya. In hindsight, the risks were worth taking. 
Th ey illustrate how dynamism in policy development can lead to greater 
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development by creating an environment where entrepreneurship and 
innovation can fl ourish. 
 Th e success of the TEAMS project was largely due to the fact that deci-
sions were made interactively and transparently, with the involvement of 
many stakeholders. We facilitated the timely completion of the project by 
giving information when it was needed, and the investors deliberated on 
issues internally before making decisions openly. 
 Th rough the 4000-member-strong industry portal KICTAnet, I 
responded directly to the public’s questions, enabling us to enrich the 
content and advance it toward the usage policy we aimed to create. Th is 
process of interactive and consultative decision-making, as described by 
Edelenbos and Klijn ( 2005 ), lent the much-needed support to the proj-
ect, enabling its completion in record time. 
 M-PESA became the enabler of e-commerce in Kenya, which had 
hitherto stagnated because of low credit-card penetration. Virtually 
every month following the introduction of M-PESA, I taught online 
start-ups about M-PESA’s application program interface, which speci-
fi es how software components should interact to create smooth pay-
ments between two diff erent fi rms. Many more developers in Kenya 
were inspired by what M-PESA could achieve and tried to emulate it. A 
few have succeeded. Nevertheless, the motivation had been established, 
leading application developers to bring their expertise to other sectors, 
mainly agriculture, health, and education, where they have helped cre-
ate massive effi  ciency improvements. 
 For this project, the theoretical approach that fi t its execution was 
Dror’s general systems theory, because those involved in pushing the pol-
icy through attempted a structured, rational way of enabling a new inno-
vation to go to market. Th ere was a degree of interactivity, too, especially 
when convincing certain players of the merits of a particular approach or 
perspective. My intentions were to get both the Treasury and the Central 
Bank to look at the problem in a broader sense. Although there were not 
many options, they could at least agree to a pilot program. My desire was 
to get to rational identifi cation of the preferable alternative—in order to 
allow Safaricom to proceed. And in the end, this is what actually occurred. 
 Th e failed land acquisition was a major setback. Business process out-
sourcing was the main reason we sought to build ICT infrastructure in 
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the fi rst place. Th e project would have sparked off  a new service industry. 
However, it was derailed by the self-interests of a handful of public ser-
vants. Th ey were veterans of the system and were able to ignite squabbles 
between the two public service departments and continue with their 
“business as usual.” 
 However, all of this off ers a great lesson, in that when there is resistance 
to change and innovation, one must be fl exible and react accordingly. 
One mistake we made in executing a presidential policy was the fact that 
we dealt with those at the strategic level, ignoring and hurting the feel-
ings of the mid-level managers who usually execute policy. 
 Self-interest and other ulterior motives are often responsible for cre-
ating paralysis in policy formulation and implementation. In retrospect, 
there are many things that we ignored and that led, as a result, to our 
policy failure. We should never have assumed there would be no resis-
tance from Postal Corporation. Had we applied interactive decision-
making theory to the Postal case as in the other cases, we might have 
succeeded. Without making any assumptions, we should have involved 
many more stakeholders, who would have prevailed on the offi  cers to 
let go of their personal motives. And we should at least have involved 
not just people at the strategy levels but the senior offi  cers and other 
fi eld staff . 
 Conclusion 
 Th is chapter has revealed that there is benefi t in a continuous review of 
policy to facilitate the emergence, commercialization, and monetization 
of new technologies. Th e chapter focused on three case studies in Kenya: 
the TEAMs project, the development of M-PESA, and the Posta land 
development project. 
 From the case studies, it is clear that in any policy implementation, 
a mechanism for involving as many stakeholders as possible is critical. 
Such mechanisms might include leveraging known theoretical founda-
tions, such as interactive decision-making, which seeks to create a col-
laborative setting where stakeholders deliberate on a policy to reduce the 
gap between political proposals and what the citizens expect. 
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 Other mechanisms involve general systems theory in order to arrive 
at a rational decision after taking all of the issues into consideration. 
Our two successful projects were successful because they applied strate-
gies based on these theoretical foundations. Our failure in the third case 
study was caused largely by the wrong assumption that a direct policy 
pronouncement from the head of state would result in automatic imple-
mentation. Th e opposite was true—a lesson that any policy needs some 
process to succeed. 
 If we fuse the analytical frameworks of general systems theory and 
interactive decision-making theory, we can use them to understand ICT- 
related policymaking in the Kenyan context. Using this approach, it 
becomes evident that a combination of the right policy environment, 
strong political will, smart investments in research and development, and 
good advisory networks led to eff ective policymaking and laid the foun-
dation for Kenya’s ICT boom. 
 For all its worth as an examination of case studies in policymaking, 
this chapter is still a personal narrative whose aim was provide the per-
spectives of three distinct cases of policy development in the context of 
emergent technologies in a developmental and democratizing setting. It 
is therefore not a generalizable view of policymaking. Th e insights from 
the chapter, grounded in theoretical analysis, however, might serve as a 
starting point for other policy practitioners seeking to understand the 
birth of ICT in Kenya. 
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 Conversation #11 
 Why Policy Matters for Entrepreneurs 
 Ory Okolloh of Omidyar Network Africa 
 Ory Okolloh  is a well-known commentator on technology trends and gover-
nance in Africa. She has worked with organizations like Omidyar Network , 
 Google Africa and the World Bank. She is also a co-founder of Ushahidi and 
Mzalendo. In 2014 ,  she was recognized as one of Time Magazine ’ s 100 most 
inﬂ uential people in the world. 
 Ory, you have been involved in Mzalendo and Ushahidi, you have 
worked for Google, and you are now in the investment space with 
Omidyar. You are also an active blogger and trained lawyer. How do 
all these diﬀ erent roles ﬁ t together? 
 I consider myself an active citizen of the world, and if something both-
ers me enough, then I will do something about it. I got into technology 
because it allows me to reach out to a number of people at once. Primarily, 
my eff orts are directed less at solving issues but rather aimed at creating a 
platform that can enable citizens to solve the problems they deem relevant. 
Mzalendo, for example, was created to give citizens access to vital informa-
tion on relevant government issues. Th e basic idea behind Mzalendo was 
to create awareness about the role and work of Members of Parliament in 
Kenya and increase the accessibility of such information. For Ushahidi we 
developed a similar idea, with a diff erent spin to it. At Ushahidi we built a 
platform that allowed people to crowd-source information directly with-
out intermediaries. My work at Google continued in a similar vein. Few 
things scale better than Google initiatives and at Omidyar, I am concerned 
with identifying the tools that entrepreneurs and innovators in our region 
require to succeed and scale beyond national borders. In sum, I am moti-
vated by how I can put my skills to use most eff ectively—that is, providing 
a platform so that problems become visible and get solved. 
 How would you describe your work at Omidyar? 
 My task is to bring an African perspective into the investment 
 opportunities. We need more investments into ventures that make sense 
for the region and its entrepreneurs. Th is simply requires a thorough under-
standing of both the region and the investment opportunities. For example, 
on the entrepreneur side, we need to demystify the art of pitching and mar-
keting. By the same token, we need to make sure as investors that we are 
staying close to the trends and to how African economies are evolving. All 
in all, I believe that by being more connected to the region and its entrepre-
neurs you will identify the hidden jewels that can have an immense impact. 
 Why are many entrepreneurs likely to disengage with the govern-
ment, or “ﬂ y under the radar,” as it is often called? 
 Not just in Kenya but in the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa you fi nd 
very young democracies that suff er from high unemployment rates 
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and incapable governments that are failing to provide basic services. 
As a consequence, the perception that you should not rely on public 
goods has become the status quo—up to a point where the rule of 
thumb has become that the less you deal with government the better. 
We have become very creative and innovative in developing entrepre-
neurial solutions that work around public goods failures. However, 
at some point, you will notice that you are stuck, and you will have 
to engage with public policy. I believe that this idea—not expecting 
anything from your government—is harmful. Entrepreneurship and 
government are not two separate issues. Th ey are interdependent right 
from the start. 
 Th ere is a reason why industry lobbies in Europe and America are so 
powerful. Yes, they are entrepreneurs but they also leverage public policy 
to raise issues that are of concern to them. Th ere is a reason why Obama 
and any presidential candidate in the general elections in the USA has 
to engage with the Silicon Valley lobby. All the government chief tech-
nology offi  cers at the current White House, for example, have been for-
mer employees of big technology companies like Google or Facebook. 
Engagement with the government, as entrepreneurs, is absolutely com-
mon and needed. If this is the norm in the West, then why are we being 
asked to ignore the government? 
 Let’s take procurement, for example. Why are African governments 
not procuring more from local technology entrepreneurs if they have 
the capability? How do we expect the local tech sector to grow if there 
are no policies in place to support it? Issues like this need to be put 
on the table and require a solution for the benefi t of the region’s ICT 
sector. 
 Who are the kinds of entrepreneurs that tend to get more involved in 
channeling information to policymakers? 
 We are starting to see more senior entrepreneurs become involved. 
Engaging the government is hard work and requires persistence. You can-
not expect to knock on their door and see the change immediately com-
ing through. Long meetings with policymakers where you move one step 
backward to go one forward are exhausting, especially when you know 
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that you could be using this time for your business and get way more 
done. However, when the new solution that you crafted with policy-
makers becomes national and permanent, meaning a law, then you have 
achieved something for everyone else as well. Entrepreneurs should see 
this as a diff erent kind of hack. 
 Let us say entrepreneurship also has a ﬂ avor of being an activist for 
society. Th en what should the role of the government be? 
 Th e role of the government should be to create an opportunity for 
entrepreneurs to thrive. Th at is it! I am not pushing toward the other 
extreme, in which government will have to do everything. I am advocat-
ing for an enabling environment. 
 If we step back, refl ect, and realize that the Kenyan population is 
in general quite entrepreneurial then we can start shifting some of the 
responsibility to them rather than shifting it even further away from 
them. Governments and policymakers do not need to do everything by 
themselves. What if we created an environment where we can act out 
our entrepreneurial nature for society as a whole? If you ask someone 
now for a short list of items that need to change, they will tell you that 
they do not want to deal with the Nairobi City Council every two days 
as they pass by the shop or that they need a streamlined business regis-
tration process—one unifi ed license—or that access to fi nancing needs 
to be addressed. An interest rate of 25 % is not really very conducive to 
doing business. 
 However, when we disengage completely, then there is no pressure for 
people on the other side to do their jobs. 
 What are some solutions you have observed to get the government 
involved? 
 I am interested in the recent revival of residence associations, which 
was mostly driven by security concerns that are by now evolving into 
other issues. I am fascinated by the Kilimani Project Foundation, as an 
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 example. 2 It was formed by businesses and residents in the Kilimani area 
and provided a forum of vital exchange in the community. Th e idea 
goes back to a famous book,  Bowling Alone :  Th e Collapse and Revival 
of American Community , which analyzed the decline of in-person social 
interactions and how this basically undermines democracy. So you have 
to understand your neighborhood as a community where you have clear 
responsibilities as residents or business people and, on the other side, fi g-
ure out who is responsible for doing what in government. For example, 
if there is a blocked drain on your street, it is more eff ective for you to 
complain collectively to the right local government entity than to solo on 
social media. 
 All in all, we need to think about ways to keep the government 
involved, rather than thinking of ways to stay under the radar. If we do 
not bring forth the issues that matter to those that can change them, then 
we will end up, if we are unlucky, with solutions that are only a tempo-
rary fi x—or with no solutions at all. 
 Th anks you, Ory! 
2  See  http://kilimani.co.ke / 
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